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NOTES

or a constitutional requirement. 16 Now that the Mapp decision
has made clear the constitutional nature of the rule, perhaps the
waiver which could result from a failure to file the motion
before trial should be re-examined. It is arguable that such a
highly regarded right ought not be lost for mere failure to file
the pre-trial motion. 7 However, if such a procedure is established by statute clearly setting forth its requisites and providing for entertainment of the motion within the court's discretion
at any time, there would appear to be adequate opportunity for
a defendant to assert his fourth amendment rights. Without
some compulsion to dispose of the issue before trial, it would
seem that the result might be undue interruption and prolongation of criminal trials.
James L. Dennis

EXECUTORY PROCESS -

ANNULMENT OF SEIZURE AND SALE

FOR LACK OF AUTHENTIC EVIDENCE

More than five weeks after the sale of certain property under
executory process, the plaintiffs, heirs of the deceased mortgagor, sued to annul the seizure and sale on the ground that it was
not supported by sufficient authentic evidence.' This alleged insufficiency was caused by the failure of the clerk of court to
certify the copy of the mortgage presented to the trial court.
The defendant mortgagee had precipitated the sale, had purchased the property himself, and was in possession of it at the
time the heirs' action was brought. He contended that plaintiffs
were precluded 2 from attacking the sale because they had had
notice of the proceeding and had failed to interpose an objection
prior to the sale. The district court dismissed. Upon appeal to
the Fourth Circuit, held, reversed. A mortgagor or his successors
are not precluded from attacking a sale made under executory
16. See Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949) ; McNabb v. United States, 318
U.S. 332 (1943).
17. See United States v. Ascendio, 171 F.2d 122 (3d Cir. 1948) ; Application
of Bogish, 173 A.2d 906 (N.J. App. 1961).

1. There were also allegations of failure of the record to include evidence of
notice of appointment of an attorney to represent the succession, and a defect
in the advertisements announcing the proposed sale.
2. Actually, the defendant urged that "because of laches, the plaintiff was
estopped" to attack the sale. But neither the defendant's brief nor the court's
opinion seems to make any distinction between laches and estoppel. Because of
the ambiguity of the opinion on this phase of the case, it is assumed for the pur-

poses of this Note that the court meant that the plaintiff was not precluded from
recovering, either from inordinate delay or because of conduct inducing detrimental
reliance.
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process based upon insufficient authentic evidence where the
purchaser-mortgagee is still the owner of the property and is
charged with, and is responsible for, the lack of authentic evidence. Doherty v. Randazzo, 128 So. 2d 669 (La. App. 4th Cir.

1961).
In a proceeding via executiva the mover must produce authentic evidence of his right to enforce his privilege or mortgage. 3
Authentic evidence is deemed necessary because executory proc-

ess is an expeditious and harsh ex parte remedy. If executory
process is unavailable, the only practical injury to the creditor is
4
to force him to resort to an ordinary proceeding.
Lack of sufficient authentic evidence is an affirmative defense which may be urged before the sale by injunction or sus-

pensive appeal.5 The general rule is that once the property has
been sold to one other than the mortgagee the mortgagor may
not ground a suit to recover the property upon defects which he
might have urged prior to the sale." However, there are excep3. LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 2635 (1960) : "The plaintiff shall submit
with his petition the authentic evidence necessary to prove his right to use executory process to enforce the mortgage or privilege. These exhibits shall include
authentic evidence of:
"(1) The note, bond, or other instrument evidencing the obligation secured by
the mortgage or privilege;
"(2) The authentic act of mortgage or privilege importing a confession of
judgment; and
"(3) Any judgment, judicial letters, order of court, or authentic act necessary
to complete the proof of plaintiff's right to use executory process.
"This requirement of authentic evidence is relaxed only in those cases, and to
the extent, provided by law."
See also Miller, Lyon & Co. v. Cappel, 36 La. Ann. 264 (1884) ; Ricks v. Bernstein, 19 La. Ann. 141 (1867).
4. LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 2644 (1960).

5. Devolutive appeal in executory proceedings has been abolished. Id. art.
2642; General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Kroger, 136 So. 2d 402 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1961).
6. Continental Securities Corp. v. Wetherbee, 187 La. 773, 175 So. 571 (1936)
Turner v. French, 171 La. 431, 131 So. 289 (1930) ; Ouachita National Bank v.
Shell Beach Const. Co., 154 La. 709, 98 So. 160 (1923) ; Franek v. Brewster, 141
La. 1031, 76 So. 187 (1917) ; King v. Hardwood Mfg. Co., 140 La. 753, 73 So.
853 (1917) ; Citizens' Bank v. Bellamy Lumber Co., 140 La. 497, 73 So. 308
(1916) ; Pons v. Yazoo & M.V. R.R., 122 La. 156, 47 So. 449 (1908) ; Huber v.
Jennings-Heywood Oil Syndicate, 111 La. 747, 35 So. 889 (1904); Herber v.
Thompson, 46 La. Ann. 186, 14 So. 504 (1894) ; Burden v. Peoples' Homestead &
Savings Ass'n, 167 So. 487 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1936) ; Miller v. People's Homestead
& Savings Ass'n, 161 So. 656 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1935) ; Madden v. Lowe, 3 La.
App. 24 (2d Cir. 1925). Most of the cases espousing this rule have involved devolutive appeals where the property had been sold pending appeal. Before the enactment of the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure, the cases held that when property
was sold through executory process pending devolutive appeal, the appeal would
be dismissed because there had been an execution of the order and the question
was then moot. Contra, Baulieu v. Furst, 8 Rob. 485 (La. 1844). See Comment,
17 TUL. L. REV. 630 (1943); Note, 14 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEw 289 (1953).

If the mortgagor acquiesces in the executory proceedings, or is present in the
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tions to this rule.7 One exception was established by the case of
Viley v. Wall," where the mortgagee had conspired with the directors of the mortgagor-corporation to defraud its stockholders by mortgaging corporate property, enforcing the mortgage
by executory process, and having the property adjudicated to
themselves. The Supreme Court allowed the mortgagor-corporation to recover the property from the mortgagee in a derivative
action brought by its stockholders. In dictum, the Supreme Court
indicated that perhaps fraud is not a necessary ingredient to
such an action and that whenever the rights of innocent third
parties will not be jeopardized, the mortgagor may rescind the
sale if the mortgagee has knowledge of and is responsible for the
defects in the executory proceeding. 9
parish and allows the sale to go uncontested, he may not thereafter annul the judgment. LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 2003 (1960).

7. Stapleton v. Butterfield, 34 La. Ann. 822 (1882) (Plaintiff sued to recover
property sold under executory process. The defendant-purchaser was not the mortgagee, yet the plaintiff prevailed. The note and mortgage clearly indicated that
they had been executed by a married woman and this was sufficient to put a third
party on notice of defects.) ; Germaine v. Mallerich, 31 La. Ann. 371 (1879)
(Plaintiff, wife of deceased mortgagor, sued as tutrix of her daughter to annul
a sale of property made under executory process. The defendant-purchaser was
not the mortgagee. The plaintiff had signed papers of appraisement without
authority after the mortgagor's demise. This fact was patent on the face of the
appraisement papers, and the defendant had full knowledge of the facts at the
time of the sale. The plaintiff was allowed to recover.). In Farrell v. Klumpp,
13 La. Ann. 311 (1858), the defendant mortgagor was present in the state, but the
plaintiff was unable to locate him, and had notice to appoint an appraiser served
on an attorney appointed by the court. The court held the sale invalid because of
the improper appointment and service of notice. Such an appointment, service,
and judicial sale would be valid today. The definition of "absentee" in executory
proceedings was later broadened to include a person who might still be in the state,
but who could not be found and served after diligent effort. La. Code of Practice
art. 277 (1870), as amended, La. Acts 1920, No. 130, § 1. This broadened definition was adopted by the Code of Civil Procedure for all purposes. LA. CODE OF
CIvI

PROCEDURE art. 5251(1)

(1960).

8. 154 La. 221, 97 So. 409 (1923).
9. Id. at 229-30, 97 So. at 411-12: "[D]efendants contend that . . . plaintiff
did not know of said proceedings before the sale, and, having failed either to
appeal from the order of seizure and sale or to enjoin the same, he is now barred
from . . . annulling the mortgage and sale; in other words, that the sole remedy
in such proceedings is to appeal or enjoin.
"We have . .. been unable to find any decision sustaining this view; nor have
defendants cited any case so holding where the property had not passed out of
the hands of the purchaser at such sale, and who was charged with knowledge of
and participationin the fraud and conspiracy, or other nullities or illegalities upon
which the same was attacked." (Emphasis added.) In support of this language,
the Supreme Court cited the three cases discussed in note 7 supra.
There is a possibility that the court in the instant case might have considered
the doctrine discussed in Graham v. Egan, 15 La. Ann. 97, 98 (1860). In considering whether to give the mortgagor money damages or restore the property
itself, the court said in regard to restitution: "[Hie can restore the property itself, and place the [mortgagor] in the same condition he would have occupied if
he had not been harassed with an unfounded demand. This is precisely what is
meant by the restitution in integrum. If there be ground for restitution at all,
there is the same ground for a complete restitution, a restitution in integrum."
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In the instant case the court, relying on the Viley dictum, held
that the mortgagor could recover, from the mortgagee, property
sold through executory process, where there had been insufficient authentic evidence and where the mortgagee still owned
the property and was responsible for and had knowledge of the
deficiency, although no fraud was found. It is unclear from the
opinion whether the mortgagee-adjudicatee must have instigated
the sale or have had knowledge of defects in order for the sale
to be subject to annulment by the mortgagor. The court did not
indicate that prompt action to rescind is necessary. Apparently
annulment is available so long as the adjudicatee at the sale convoked by executory process remains the owner of the property.
Under the instant case, a mortgagor is not limited to injunction or suspensive appeal when attacking a sale of his property
by executory process. This holding would establish another safeguard against abuse of this expeditious remedy, yet its result
would not seem to pose any substantial problem to title examiners involving sales by executory process since recovery is available only where the property has not passed out of the hands of
the mortgagee-adjudicatee. This seems justifiable because executory process is a harsh, ex parte remedy and should be restricted
to situations where the formal requirements for protecting the
rights of mortgagors are clearly satisfied.
Bert K. Robinson

PARENT AND CHILD - EXTENT OF PARENT'S
FAMILY LAW OBLIGATION To PROVIDE PSYCHIATRIC CARE FOR MAJOR CHILD

Plaintiff sued his father for support in the amount of
$1750.00 per month needed to defray the cost of necessary hospitalization and psychiatric care. Expert testimony was to the
effect that treatment in a state hospital would be inadequate
but that with treatment in a private hospital plaintiff had a "5050 chance of surviving." Defendant father testified that his income was $1,140.00 per month and that his assets exclusive of
his business, his residence, and the cash value of his insurance
had a total appraised value of less than $13,000.00. The trial
court awarded $450.00 per month, and the plaintiff appealed,
seeking to have the award increased to the $1750.00 per month
requested. Upon appeal to the Fourth Circuit, held, affirmed.

